Thecontinuitiesbetweenhumanandanimalmindsareincreasinglywellunderstood.Thishasledmanypeopletomakeclaimsaboutconsciousnessinanimals,whichhasoftenbeentakentobecrucialfortheirmoralstanding.PeterCarruthersarguescompellinglythatthereisnofactofthemattertobediscovered,andthatthequestionofanimalconsciousnessisofnoscientificorethicalsignificance.Carruthersofferssolutionstotworelatedpuzzles.Thefirstisabouttheplaceofphenomenal--orfelt--consciousnessinthenaturalorder.Consciousnessisshowntocomprisefine-grainednonconceptualcontentsthatare“globallybroadcast“toawiderangeofcognitivesystemsforreasoning,decision-making,andverbalreport.Moreover,theso-called“hard“problemofconsciousnessresultsmerelyfromthedistinctivefirst-personconceptswecanusewhenthinkingaboutsuchcontents.Nospecialnon-physicalproperties--noso-called“qualia“--areinvolved.Thesecondpuzzleconcernsthedistributionofphenomenalconsciousnessacrosstheanimalkingdom.Carruthersshowsthatthereisactuallynofactofthematter,becausethoughtsaboutconsciousnessinothercreaturesrequireustoprojectourfirst-personconceptsintotheirminds;butsuchprojectionsfailtoresultindeterminatetruth-conditionswhenthosemindsaresignificantlyunlikeourown.Thisupshot,however,doesn’tmatter.Itdoesn’tmatterforscience,becausenoadditionalpropertyenterstheworldasonetransitionsfromcreaturesthataredefinitelyincapableofphenomenalconsciousnesstothosethatdefinitelyare(namely,ourselves).Andonmanyviewsitdoesn’tmatterforethics,either,sinceconcernforanimalscanbegroundedinsympathy,whichrequiresonlythird-personunderstandingofthedesiresandemotionsoftheanimalsinquestion,ratherthaninfirst-personempathy.
CALLED ANIMAL HUMAN MAKING MINDS
