StephenIngramdefendsarobustlyrealisticmetaethicaltheory,basedontheconceptofnormativearbitrariness,ofwhichheprovidesthefirstin-depthanalysis.Hearguesthat,inordertocapturethenormativenon-arbitrarinessofmoralchoice,wemustcommittotheexistenceofrobustlystance-independent,categorical,irreduciblynormative,non-naturalmoralfacts.Specifically,heidentifiesfivewaysinwhichametaethicaltheorymightfailtocapturethenon-arbitrarinessofmoralchoice.Thefirstinvolvesclaimsaboutthebrutenessofmoralattitudesorfacts.Thesecondinvolvesclaimsabouttheprivilegingofsomeattitudesoverothers.Thethirdinvolvestheclaimthatsomemetaethicaltheoriesleaveanormativedeficit.Thefourthinvolvesaclaimaboutourownershipovermoralreality.Andthefifthinvolvestheclaimthatcertainmetaethicaltheoriesintroduceadestabilisingcontingencyintothemoraldomain.Ingramarguesthatrobustrealismisthetheorythatisbestplacedtoavoidallfiveofthesearbitrarinesscharges.Hethengoesontoshowthat,byexploringthenatureofinterpersonalmoraldialogue,robustrealistscandefendepistemologicalandmeta-semantictheoriesthatarefriendlytotheirview.Specifically,hedefendsadualisticformofmoralintuitionismonwhichsomemoralbeliefsarejustifiedonthebasisofaprioriintuitions,whilstothersarejustifiedonthebasisofaposteriorimoralexperiences,andprovidesatheoryof’moralmentalfiles’toexplainhowmoraltermsandconceptsareabletorefertorobustmoralfacts.
